




The Japanese Military Administration Department of 
Research Reports on Singapore’s Wartime Economy 
Shinobu MAJIMA 
Introduction
A photograph published by the Illustrated London News on 7 February 
1942 shows the principal buildings and sites of Singapore. The Raffl es Hotel 
is on the left and the Supreme Court on the right, with the harbour and sea in 
the background. It was taken from the top of the YMCA building near Fort 
Canning, and a week or so later everything shown in the photograph was 
occupied by the Japanese army. The Department of Research (Chōsabu) of 
the Southern Military Administration Superintendent General’s Offi ce (Nanpō 
Gunsei Sōkanbu), one of the research teams dispatched by the Japanese 
Government to Southeast Asia, used the Raffles Hotel, Supreme Court and 
Fort Canning during its members’ stay in Singapore. The YMCA building 
was used by the Military Police. The Chōsabu was assigned to investigate 
the newly occupied Malaya and Singapore, and entrusted to supervise other 
research teams in Sumatra (Manchurian Railway Co.), Java (Institute for East 
Asian Affairs, Planning Board of Japan), North Borneo (Pacific Association) 
and the Philippines (Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute).1 With a staff of 
40, the Chōsabu became involved in both surveying and running the economy 
of Singapore and Malaya between the end of 1942 and the end of the Second 




The wartime activities of the Chōsabu researchers in Singapore have 
attracted little academic attention in the past, with a limited number of articles 
and chapters written in English and Japanese on the subject. This small existing 
body of literature has given a general picture of the team’s time in occupied 
Singapore and/or discussed in greater detail the involvement of the two 
prominent researchers – Itagaki Yoichi (1908–2003) and Akamatsu Kaname 
(1896–1974) – in political activities that led to their failed attempt to gain 
independence for the locals towards the end of the war.2 No substantial work 
has been done to date, however, to investigate the socio-economic content of the 
research reports themselves; these were mostly handwritten and mimeographed 
amid the circumstances of occupation and economic collapse. This article 
thus provides the fi rst in-depth analysis based on careful reading of the details 
of the Chōsabu reports, focusing on wartime economic matters. It reveals an 
alternative picture of the researchers’ presence in Singapore that differs from 
the stories focused around the fi nal few months of the war.
The Chōsabu members were mainly economists from the Institute of 
East Asian Economies at the Tokyo University of Commerce, which was the 
forerunner of the Institute of Economic Research at Hitotsubashi University, a 
Japanese equivalent to the London School of Economics and Political Science. 
When the researchers were fi rst put up at the Raffl es Hotel, they were thrilled 
by the music bands, the tropical fruits and the genteel colonial culture of 
Singapore. Although the propaganda of the military state denounced what it 
depicted as Western decadence, ‘the Japanese in fact enjoy modern Western 
products, living like white men and conquerors in Malaya’.3 During their 
assignment in Malaya and Singapore, more than 60 reports were printed and 




ranking officers and advisors to the Southern Military Administration. These 
included Marquis Tokugawa Yoshichika (1886–1976), a friend of Sultan 
Ibrahim I of Johor, fluent in Bahasa Melayu, who was also known to have 
struggled to save Singapore’s Raffl es Museum to become an academic core of 
the Southern Regions; and Shinozaki Mamoru (1908–1991), a Foreign Offi ce 
attaché before the war, sometimes credited with producing a large number 
of permits for the Chinese residents of Singapore at the beginning of the 
occupation.4
The Chōsabu team was led by Akamatsu, a professor of economic policy 
at the Tokyo University of Commerce, who had been specially recruited to 
head the Institute of East Asian Economies in 1941. The fl ying geese pattern 
of economic development (in which less-developed economies catch up with 
more advanced ones) for which Akamatsu became well-known later in the 
1960s,5 was first theorized in the 1930s as he observed the Japanese textile 
industry overtaking the British as the leader in world trade. For this continuity 
in his pre-war and post-war academic interests, we might expect to fi nd a policy 
application of Akamatsu’s trajectory also in the wartime reports on Singapore 
written by his team.6 An emphasis on a more practical industrial policy-making 
in the occupied areas, or even an attempt to build a developmentalist state in 
wartime Malaya and Singapore, might be expected from the reports. Curiously, 
however, this dimension of development economics was missing from the main 
body of the Chōsabu reports. Why was the catching-up theory not central to the 
work of his team and what else characterizes the unique collection of economic 
research reports in its absence?
This article first briefly discusses how the reports should be read and 
evaluated, considering the role played by the Chōsabu team in the Southern 
Military Administration. The second part puts the authors of the Chōsabu 
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reports in a wider academic context, focusing particularly on two junior 
economists, Yamada Isamu (1909–1986) and Higuchi Gorō (1906–1971), who 
produced more reports than Akamatsu or Itagaki. The third part traces how 
they came to be involved in carrying out various policies to ameliorate the 
adverse effects of the deepening war and the increasing military monopoly. 
The fourth and final part tells the afterstory of how the Chōsabu members 
returned to endure the psychological burden of cooperating with the Military 
Administration in post-war Japan.
The Tokyo University of Commerce was given the offi cial offer to form a 
team of researchers as the Chōsabu on 30 June 1942. Its mission was laid out 
on 16 August by a Secret Order from the army, and its members were sent to 
Singapore in December, a year after the outbreak of war which they knew could 
never win.7 They were ordered to conduct research on how best to extract the 
natural resources essential to national defence, to ensure economic stability 
in the occupied areas and to give guidance to the various ethnic communities 
in the region. The reports were written broadly within these categories, but 
the individual research themes were chosen by the researchers themselves. 
The Chōsabu men recalled in their memoirs that they thought they were doing 
‘research for research’s sake only’ and on that basis decided to collaborate with 
the army, but in reality during the occupation they became involved in actual 
policy implementation.8
They were given almost complete autonomy on what they could express 
through the reports – they were even free to give ‘verdicts’ or recommendations 
on the policies of the Military Administration.9 These were concisely 
summarized at the beginning of each report and gave recommended solutions 
to administrative problems, based on their conscientious, rational judgement. 




stages of Japan’s occupation, not on the fi nal outcome of war economy: they 
had to halt their research, and produced no more reports in the fi nal half year 
of occupation. The real ‘verdicts’ of the war economy may rather be found in 
Chin Kee Onn’s frequently-cited Malaya Upside Down, published right after 
the war in 1946.10 The Chōsabu’s and Chin’s perceptions of the socio-economic 
problems resonate with each other on a number of themes. This article focuses 
on those socio-economic themes, such as the black market, infl ation and rice 
rations, mimeographed between the spring of 1943 and the winter of 1944, 
which best characterize the roles of the Chōsabu researchers, ranging from mute 
collaborators to institutional dissenters in the Japanese Military Administration.
The Chōsabu Researchers’ Reports
The 48 surviving reports written by the Chōsabu team cover a diverse range 
of topics. Those recruited to supplement the team of economists – including a 
bio-scientist, a medical doctor and researchers on religion and education – wrote 
on their preferred subjects. The political economists, such as Itagaki, developed 
ethno-political interests and translated reference materials on Muslim religious 
conventions.11 Just over half of the reports (26 of the 48) focus on the economic 
themes of labour, mining and manufacturing, commerce, transport, money and 
finance. The depth of the arguments and complexity of the analyses indicate 
that food, commerce and money were priority themes, stemming from the 
problems caused by the war and the cessation of international trade – namely 
the ever-pressing interrelated issues of rationing, in-migration and inflation, 
which affected the everyday life of Singaporeans. Research and development 
relating to the manufacturing industry, especially on utilization of available 
resources in the Southern Regions, was not part of the Chōsabu’s remit. The 
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Committee for Resource Utilization, established at the beginning of 1943 
with representatives from the military and private businesses, discussed the 
possibility of industrialization using the primary commodities of the Southern 
Regions. From the Chōsabu, one representative was sent in as an observer.12 
The Chōsabu reports rarely discussed primary commodities, but allocated more 
space for discussion on distributive issues related to the ordinary Singaporeans 
as consumers and workers during of the Japanese occupation. Their reports 
reveal the progression of the Chōsabu researchers’ thoughts, attitudes and 
actions during the course of the deepening adverse situation.
The reports span the two-year period from spring 1943 to winter 1944, 
which covers two rounds of a plan-action-evaluation cycle in the Japanese 
Military Administration in Singapore, starting around the time of the annual 
allocation of food rations at the beginning of the fiscal year in April. The 
researchers were initially not involved in planning, but in evaluating the policy 
outcomes. Many of the reports were submitted and mimeographed in the 
autumn months – 12 of the 26 reports from 1943, and 10 of the 22 reports from 
1944 were dated September, October and November. Conferences for all the 
heads of research in the Southern Regions were also held in spring and autumn, 
which provided important occasions to set the overall research agenda and to 
showcase the Chōsabu team’s research outcomes to the high officials of the 
Military Administration.
The Chōsabu was also responsible for coordination of surveys conducted by 
other departments of the Military Administration and the Syonan Municipality. 
Team members also instructed departments and research offi ces in other parts of 
the Southern Regions to produce reports on the state of economy and industry 
at the beginning of 1943, particularly before they settled down to start their own 




their assignment the importance of using standard research methods for surveys 
for all the southern research teams and offices, probably having been struck 
by the lack of empiricism and the arbitrariness in the format of reports written 
by the other offices in Singapore.13 Not all research bodies eagerly followed 
the empirical research methods recommended by the Tokyo University of 
Commerce academics, but some did provide raw data on price and population 
for the Chōsabu researchers. They were then able to compile and analyse this 
and give their own verdicts on the war economy, based on a critical reading of 
the data.14
The third part of this article begins with an examination of the contents 
of the reports written not by the Chōsabu but by the Departments of Police 
Administration and General Affairs in Spring 1943;15 then moves on to discuss 
the survey reports written in response by the Chōsabu in Autumn 1943;16 the 
Chōsabu’s renewed policy recommendations made in Spring 1944;17 and fi nally 
the action reports put together by the Chōsabu in Autumn 1944.18 These are 
spread over the two annual plan-action-evaluation cycles. A comparison of the 
contents and the rhetoric, both overt and hidden, reveals both the progression 
of the researchers’ thoughts and convictions and how this affected their own 
actions over the course of time. However, before venturing on to the detailed 
deciphering of the reports themselves, let us fi rst investigate what the Chōsabu 
researchers meant by ‘standardized’ methods, and what their visions were 
before and after their arrival in Singapore, that may be revealed by learning the 
background of their academic training in Japan.




The idea of sending a group of researchers to the south started at the Tokyo 
University of Commerce with the President Ueda Teijirō’s (1879–1940) trip 
to China in 1939 before the outbreak of the war in the Pacific.19 His tour 
around the colonized cities of Asia – including Seoul, Dalian and Beijing – 
was sponsored by Kagami Kenkichi (1869–1939), the president of Tokyo Fire 
and Marine Insurance Co., an internationally known businessman once on 
the cover of TIME magazine. Both Ueda and Kagami were proponents of the 
free trade movement in the inter-war period. Ueda was a student of Fukuda 
Tokuzō (1874–1930), who despite never holding the post of president of the 
Tokyo University of Commerce is considered the most influential figure in 
the University’s history, promoting it from a former commercial school to a 
university. Fukuda was infl uenced by Lujo Brentano during his time studying in 
Munich between 1898 and 1900,20 and used Marshall’s Principles of Economics 
(for which Brentano wrote the introduction to the German translation) as a 
textbook for the first time in Japan, having had it translated by his student 
Ōtsuka Kinnosuke (1892–1977). Ōtsuka later became the central character 
responsible for reforming the Institute of East Asian Economies after the 
Second World War. Akamatsu, Nakayama Ichirō (1898–1980) – known as the 
Japanese Schumpeter – and Sugimoto Eiichi (1901–1952) were also students 
of Fukuda, and represented the diverse range of subject matters in economics 
studied and taught in Japanese universities.
Ueda, the founder of the Institute of East Asian Economies, had studied in 
England, where he was initially infl uenced by William Ashley, the founder of 
the Faculty of Commerce at the University of Birmingham, but then moved to 




Cotton Industry.21 Ueda also toured around Germany and the US, visiting 
Wall Street and Harvard Business School before returning to Japan. 22 A few 
decades later Akamatsu, who had learned case study methodology at Harvard 
Business School, was invited by Ueda to lead the Institute from October 1941.23 
At the other end of the ideological spectrum was Ōtsuka, who had studied 
at the University of Berlin under the supervision of Werner Sombart. By the 
outbreak of the war he was no longer at the Tokyo University of Commerce, 
having been arrested by the Special Higher Police in 1933 for writing a chapter 
of the History of the Development of Capitalism in Japan.24 Succeeding to 
Ōtsuka’s teaching position in the socialist-leaning principles of economics – in 
parallel to Nakayama’s lecture course on the principles of modern economics 
– was Sugimoto, who had just returned from Germany via America. He had 
studied at the Institute for the World Economy (Institut für Weltwirtschaft) at 
the University of Kiel, where he became acquainted with Wassily Leontif. An 
expert on quantitative economics, Sugimoto briefl y joined the Chōsabu for half 
a year and laid the foundations for the standardized empirical survey methods. 
He was critical of the future of Japanese militarism, and was reported as saying 
to the rest of the Chōsabu team on his departure from Singapore that ‘the war 
will be lost and you will be captured’.
The generation of junior researchers of the Chōsabu did not have the 
privilege of studying abroad like their seniors but were influenced by the 
disciples of Fukuda Tokuzō, including Ueda, Akamatsu, Ōtsuka, Nakayama 
and Sugimoto. Before and during the war, Sugimoto focused on introducing 
methods to estimate demand and supply of rice using statistical data collected 
by the Ministry of Agriculture, and was also involved in setting up a survey 
of household expenditure at the Cabinet Statistical Offi ce, employing Yamada 
Isamu for the actual data work.25 Yamada was educated at the Nagoya 
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Commercial School and worked at the Industrial Physics Laboratory before 
moving to Yokohama Commercial School, where he was discovered by 
Nakayama and invited to join the Institute of East Asian Economies.26 Yamada’s 
main research focus was statistics and standards of living. Before coming to 
Singapore, he had produced a series of agricultural production indices for 
Japan, Taiwan and Korea, which were published as the first – and the last, 
because of the war – monograph of the Institute.27 Yamada’s research showed 
that, unlike Japan and Taiwan where an increase in rice production led to a 
reduction in other grain crops, Korea saw a parallel increase in production of 
both rice and other grains.28 This is evidence of the harsh reality of Korea’s rice 
exports to Japan, which left the locals to survive on other grains, despite rice 
being a staple of the Korean diet. Yamada was the kind of empirical researcher 
who quietly gathered hard evidence to present as criticism of the military state. 
He was sent by Sugimoto to work on the household expenditure survey while 
still in Japan in 1941, and he was particularly concerned with the lowest levels 
of living among labourers and peasants.29 
Unlike other junior researchers, Yamada refused to take up the position of 
‘civil administrator’ of the army but insisted on joining the Chōsabu team as 
an academic researcher. While others received increased earnings and a special 
promotion of two ranks, Yamada did not receive a promotional payment for 
becoming an army officer, but was instead promoted nominally within the 
University to the post of assistant professor when he left for Singapore.30 Itagaki 
did not double as a civil administrator, either, having been an assistant professor 
for a year, teaching ‘colonial policy’ at the time of his departure.31 His early 
wartime experience was quite different from the rest of the younger scholars, 
having been privately funded to travel to Indonesia and give public talks on 




Higuchi Gorō is one of those Chōsabu junior staff who became civil 
administrators and about whom not much is known. He was probably a 
disciple of Yamaguchi Shigeru (1893–1974): after the war they co-authored 
a monograph on inflation in Japan.33 Yamaguchi, the most established of 
the business scholars of accounting and banking at the Tokyo University of 
Commerce, was a student of the fi rst president of the University, Sano Zensaku 
(1873–1952), whose academic inclination derived from the tradition of the 
former commercial school. Sano was the headmaster of the commercial school 
when he was endorsed by the Western-educated Fukuda to be the fi rst president 
of the University, which Fukuda struggled to establish. The fourth president, 
Takase Sōtarō (1892–1966), also derived from Sano’s group of scholars, and 
sent Yamaguchi to investigate the extremely high infl ation in Shanghai, while 
sending the rest of the Institute to Singapore. Both Yamaguchi and Higuchi 
argued that infl ation in Shanghai, and to a lesser extent in Singapore, was the 
result not of an issue of excess currency but of a growing demand for material 
goods. Although the increased issue of military scrip was a fundamental 
cause of price increases, Yamaguchi and Higuchi were not overtly critical of 
the printing of money, focusing more on the fact that wartime inflation was 
exacerbated by acute shortages of goods.
Before travelling to the south, Higuchi did not write for the annual report 
for the Institute of East Asian Economies as the senior Chōsabu members 
did,34 nor did he produce a monograph like Yamada’s,35 but he did give an oral 
presentation at an in-house weekly seminar on 20 July 1942 on the topic of 
‘fi nancing the Co-prosperity Sphere’.36 The Tokyo University of Commerce had 
started responding to the call for cooperation in nationalists’ effort and tilted 
towards the eventual war in 1940 and 1941 by setting up the Institute in April 
and sending students to Shanghai as the ‘Building Asia’ Student Voluntary 
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Work Force in August 1941. After 8 December 1941, with the outbreak of war, 
the University and the Institute offered their services to the army section of 
the Imperial Headquarters through the brother of Takase, the then president of 
the University, who worked in the Department of General Staff.37 The weekly 
seminar at which Higuchi and other members of the Institute presented their 
preparatory research began in April 1942, with Akamatsu presenting first on 
‘the pattern of industrial development in the developing countries’, followed 
by Yamada – in second place – on ‘measurement of economic self-suffi ciency’. 
Yamaguchi presented on ‘Asian characters in currency’ in May and Sugimoto 
on ‘the heterogeneous character of the East Asian economy’ in June, followed 
by junior scholars like Higuchi.38 These topics demonstrate their specific 
research interests, but notably the topic of colonial ethnic policy that Itagaki 
had been propagating elsewhere, such as at Dai Nippon Colonial Studies, was 
missing on these occasions.39 On 17 August 1942, Akamatsu gave a talk on 
‘building Great East Asia’, right after receiving the Chōsabu research plan as a 
Secret Order from the army. From surviving records, it is not possible to know 
how far Akamatsu discussed the plan with the staff members. Nevertheless, it is 
signifi cant that the Chōsabu research reports produced later in Singapore never 
repeated the phrase ‘building Asia’.
Spring 1943: Setting the Scene
In February 1943, a month or so after the Chōsabu’s journey to the south, 
a meeting for all heads of research in the Southern Regions was held in 
Singapore. ‘Research on minimum standards of living’ and ‘research on how 
to set up a trade and fi nance system in the Co-prosperity Sphere’ became the 




administration.40 In other words, having arrived in Singapore, the Chōsabu was 
more interested in restoring the order of former British free trade imperialism 
than in developing a new Asia under a socio-economic plan to give a big 
push through industrialization of the occupied areas. This interest did not 
contradict the Imperial Army Headquarters’ new emphasis on establishing a 
framework to fi ght the ‘decisive war’ till the end, turning away from the initial 
optimistic vision of ‘building Asia’ through the Co-prosperity Sphere. Although 
not directly related to a free trade framework per se, the new emphasis of 
the Military Administration was placed more upon ‘winning the hearts and 
minds’ of the people, which in effect meant giving more economic autonomy 
to the collaborative local traders. A guideline handout prepared by the Tokyo 
University of Commerce academics was not, however, well received by the 
other commercial and/or governmental research teams. Individual teams each 
ended up working on their own accounts in different parts of Southeast Asia.
As noted earlier, Akamatsu, an expert on patterns of industrialization, did 
not author any reports himself, and the Chōsabu did not leave any substantial 
research results on the issues of industrialization. However, the report prepared 
by the Research Offi ce of the Southern Military Administration Department of 
General Affairs, which was probably in charge of research activities before the 
arrival of the Tokyo University of Commerce researchers, gives information 
about the state of the industrial sector in Singapore at the beginning of 1943. 
Written as reference material for the Committee for Resource Utilization, the 
Research Office’s report entitled Important Industrial Factories in Syonan 
Municipality41 gives details of two dozen or so factories in Singapore, ranging 
from an electric power plant to an opium factory. A detailed description of these 
factories, including their organization and how the state-of-the-art machinery 
confi scated from the enemy companies worked, is provided in this brief report. 
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Almost all were owned by British or foreign capital before the war, and were 
transferred to Japanese management except the wine and soap factories: ‘soap 
production was one of those lucrative ventures’ set up by the locals.42
What is characteristic of this report is the overtly optimistic account of 
industrial capacity. In Malaya, fibre resources, for example, were in short 
supply. While they tried to plant cotton trees (kapok trees), sisal hemp, Manila 
hemp and other plants suitable for producing fibre, the Japanese also began 
to experiment with pineapple fibres, which were collected manually from 
pineapple leaves, as Important Industrial Factories reveals. In May 1943, hand 
spinning of pineapple fibre became possible using small wooden spinning 
wheels. The report offers a calculation of pineapple fi bre output: ‘2g of fi bre 
can be made from a pineapple leaf […] Daily production per female worker 
is 4–5 ounces. At present daily production of pineapple fi bre is 12–13 pounds, 
and over the whole peninsula it is possible to produce 2,000 tons.’43 Raising 
yearly production to this level would require at least 36,000 female workers and 
approximately 250,000 pineapples a day. This rather over-optimistic macro-
level output calculation echoes the 18,000,000 square yard target output set 
for Malaya for 1943 in the Five-Year Plan of Local Self-sufficient Economy, 
requiring a few thousand tons or more of fi bre, depending on the thickness of 
the textiles. This is one example of the barely feasible less-than-fi ve-year plan 
laid out by the Southern Military Administration in September 1943 for 1943–
1946.44
A similar kind of excessive optimism about the planned economy is evident 
in another report produced by the Department of Police Administration in 
spring 1943, entitled Conditions of Economic Security in Syonan Municipality 
and Johore. At the basic level of Singaporean life, bare-bone subsistence was 




war, because Syonan Municipality placed priority on ensuring that rationing 
was ‘efficient and effective’.45 That was achieved by adjusting the number 
of traders given permits to trade in controlled goods, at the discretion of the 
administrators. Taking rice as an example, rice rationing was initially operated 
through 50 wholesale dealers and 1,971 retailers in Syonan Municipality in 
March 1943. The author of Conditions of Economic Security notes, with an 
overtly hostile presumption towards the local traders, that: ‘there were 548 
small-scale retailers who only deal in 1–15 sacks of rice per month. Because 
the handling charge is set so low per sack of rice, it is not surprising that 
misconduct occurs’.46 The number of rice distribution stations was subsequently 
reduced to 1,007 retailers by March 1944.
Proper control of the rationing system was seen as the most crucial policy 
in stabilizing the economy and gaining approval from the local people under 
Japanese occupation. ‘Rice was the fulcrum upon which infl ation and cost of 
living see-sawed.’47 The Food Division of the Department of Industry, which 
adhered to the rules of the former British Administration, and the Department 
of Police Administration, which took a more robust approach, were together 
instrumental in overseeing the whole rationing operation. Later, as seen with 
tapioca bread and tapioca noodle rationing, the influence of the Department 
of Police Administration extended through the Auxiliary Police Assistants 
Organization. This was set up by local leaders, collaborating with the Japanese, 
who were appointed as Auxiliary Police Assistants to supervise local affairs. 
196,082 households (as of June 1944) were gathered into 5,101 teams with 
30–40 households per team.48 The Auxiliary Police Assistants issued census 
cards for the population in each team, organized night watches and promoted 
general peace and welfare, including the administration of rationing.49 The 
recommendations laid out in Conditions of Economic Security, which included 
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reduced rations for rural residents, reduced numbers of ration stations and 
unification of policing power into the Department of Police Administration, 
came to be implemented over the course of 1943/44.
The Chōsabu did work alongside the Department of Police Administration 
– for example, they used the census card records collected by the Police 
Assistants in their analyses and reports – but they also tried to correct incorrect 
assumptions made by the police administrators whenever possible in their 
subsequent reports. While the Chōsabu researchers did not collaborate in 
resource utilization in the industry sector, they did try to expand their infl uence 
over the rationing operations because researchers like Yamada were concerned 
about the lives of the local people and because issues of infl ation and cost of 
living were their areas of expertise.
Autumn 1943: the Chōsabu’s Initial Response
Standard of living
On 11–12 October, the Heads of Research Conference was held in 
Singapore, for which the Chōsabu members prepared a number of reports. The 
report entitled The Lowest Level of Living is particularly notable among those 
published in autumn 1943, as it was a direct response to the research priority 
set by the Chōsabu in February 1943. It also corrected the impression wrongly 
created by a comment of an administrative offi cer of the Department of Police 
Administration on his visit to Teregannu, as cited in Conditions of Economic 
Security: ‘it is incorrect to consider the entire Malayan population as rice eaters; 
at present many of the lower classes do not eat rice’. This official assumed 
that: ‘they keep back the rationed rice and sell it on the black market’.50 In 




Living, clearly stated that: ‘the main food of Malays is white rice’.51 Intending 
to provide accurate information on necessary consumption items for the 
subsequent full-scale household expenditure survey, he also emphasized that 
the same was true for the Chinese and Indians and that everybody was entitled 
to a ‘fair’ share of essential rice rations.
Chin in his verdict bitterly remarks: ‘The rice-consuming populace of 
Malaya revealed too openly that they could not live without rice, and the 
Japanese made full use of that fact.’52 The lure of special rice allocations to 
labourers, which often disrupted the ‘fair’ distribution, concerned Yamada’s co-
author, who cited the request made for an increase in white rice rations, while 
noting that a coolie who received 14 catties (8.4kg) of rice and meals at the 
workplace still considered the ration ‘insuffi cient’. Surveying the people at the 
lowest level of living, Yamada – who took over again from the second author 
when writing the conclusion – tried hard to present an accurate judgement. At 
the time of the survey in April–July 1943, the level of rations and the state of 
the economy were still showing a relatively stable outlook. Nominal wages had 
risen for most of the surveyed households, compared to pre-war conditions, 
except for Chinese rubber company coolies and Indian and Malay rubber 
plantation coolies. Yamada was eager to include them as respondent households 
in their survey of lowest living, being particularly sympathetic to the plight 
of plantation workers after the cessation of rubber export. The rising nominal 
income in other sectors could be the outcome of and the cause of slowly rising 
prices at that time; already in the fi rst half of 1943 the repercussions of high 
prices were felt, for example, by the Indians who struggled to obtain imported 
spices.




Another response from the Chōsabu researchers to the work done by the 
Department of Police Administration can be seen in their use of census cards 
as a data source for their analysis in Syonan Municipality Population by 
Occupation.53 On the face of it, this report only provides descriptive statistics, 
showing the number of people in each occupational category, broad and narrow, 
by ethnic group and by gender. However, reading between the lines and from 
inserted sentences on a piece of paper stuck over one page, it is clear that 
the Chōsabu members became worried about the outcome of their analysis 
if it were used against groups of people such as the Chinese in commercial 
occupations. By the time of the publication of this report in December 1943, 
plans to utilize the underused and unused workforce in important industries had 
been drawn up and the Syonan Municipality had started dispatching groups 
of Chinese migrants to Endau Settlement in November.54 The inserted note in 
Syonan Municipality Population by Occupation tries to explain why population 
numbers in other occupations apart from commerce might be underestimates, 
stating: ‘consequently, adding these numbers and merging the numerous coolies 
with those in mining and manufacturing reduces the share of commerce in the 
employed population’. This insertion was probably made to lessen the impact 
of the comment below it on the likelihood of an excessive number of people in 
commerce: ‘in view of the present state of mining and manufacturing in Syonan 
Municipality, it is not per se unlikely that there are an excessive number of 
people in commerce’.55 The Chōsabu authors were worried and were careful not 
to overemphasize the fi gure.
At the end of 1943, the Chōsabu researchers were not yet of one opinion. 
Some like Yamada, who had a stronger conviction from the beginning, were 




careful. But in 1944, for the second round of plan-action-evaluation cycle, more 
reports came to be written with fewer apparent inconsistencies among them. 
The October 1943 Heads of Research Conference, followed by the Conference 
of Science Institutions, outwardly propagated their academic achievement, 
receiving newspaper coverage in Tokyo, while inwardly consolidating the 
more liberal faction within the Military Administration. One reason the idea 
of ‘building Asia’ was retracted by the Chōsabu is revealed in the closing 
speech by Lieutenant General Takahashi Tan, Director of the General Affairs 
Department, on 12 October. He not only mentioned the diffi cult war situation 
from Burma to New Guinea, urging the heads of research to prepare for a 
decisive war, but also openly denounced the idea of building the East Asian 
Co-prosperity Sphere that was propagated at the beginning of the war. He then 
emphasized the importance of more basic-level academic research, i.e. research 
on fauna and flora of the tropics and ethno-cultural lifestyles, over practical 
short-termism, such as those seen in the ‘new industries’ of wartime substitutes. 
This might well mean that Takahashi was sympathetic to the view of Marquis 
Tokugawa who admitted the collapse of economy.56
Spring 1944: Countermeasures by the Chōsabu
In January 1944, in a comprehensive redeployment of army force allocation 
in the Southern Regions, the Malayan Military Administration came to be 
located in Kuala Lumpur, where the Chōsabu’s office also transferred. The 
Malayan Military Administration had Lieutenant General Hamada Hiroshi as 
Director of General Affairs Department; he realized that the Chōsabu might 
be useful and allowed its role to expand. It now not only wrote descriptive 
research reports but was also involved in actual implementation of policy 
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administration.57 Singapore continued to accommodate the Southern Army with 
Lieutenant General Takahashi in the General Staff’s Offi ce, and was governed 
more or less autonomously by Syonan Municipality, which had local staff 
from the previous British Administration, including a few British engineers 
and Japanese staff who knew the pre-war Singapore, and including Shinozaki 
Mamoru, who now served as Director of the Department of Welfare. When 
the Chōsabu left for the Peninsular, Yamada and his team of local statistics 
assistants were left behind under Shinozaki’s direction.58
By the end of the fiscal year 1943/44, when the Chōsabu’s planning 
recommendation for the coming year was written, the situation of food imports 
worsened. Japanese defeat at the Battle of Imphal terminated the rice import 
from Burma, which Singapore had relied upon since before the Japanese 
occupation. The report’s title was Countermeasures on price, especially in 
Syonan Municipality, and it described the measures to tackle the five-fold 
increase in prices seen over the previous year.59 The content and format of the 
report resemble Conditions of Economic Security, but the 1943 report only 
covered rice, salt and sugar as control goods, while the 1944 version explained 
the state of control and rationing for rice, vegetables, fruit, meat and fish. 
The report’s argument centred on how the revised level of rations, which was 
imposed in February 1944, could not sustain a minimum standard of living for 
the people in Singapore.60 Reduced rations meant that for an adult male general 
monthly rice rations were 8 catties (160g, 544 kcal daily), supplementary food 
rations 4 catties (80g, 273 kcal of mainly tapioca and sweet potatoes) and vegetables 
3 catties (36 kcal), which at 905 kcal amounted to well below a life-sustaining 
level. People resorted to the uncontrolled market to supplement their diets. Those 
who worked in essential factories or in the ports received a further 180g of special 




The Chōsabu’s report recommended a higher level of rations to allow 
a minimum standard of living: for an adult male rice rations of 12 catties 
(240g, 816 kcal daily), supplementary food rations 8 catties (160g, 547 kcal), 
vegetables 4.5 catties (90g, 54 kcal) and fish and meat 2.6 catties (52g, 52 
kcal). In total, the daily calorifi c intake for adult male just on general rations 
should be at least 1469 kcal.61 It then laid out a set of policy recommendations 
to tackle the problem of food shortages, which in turn were regarded as 
effective countermeasures for higher prices through increasing food production, 
streamlining freight collection, prioritizing rations, encouraging out-migration 
and increasing both controlled and uncontrolled imports of rice by the local 
traders. What the Chōsabu researchers recommended in March 1944 became 
what they actually helped implementing during the following months. Their 
activity provided the basis of the subsequent research reports published in 
September and October 1944, which put forward the requirement to crack down 
on harmful practices of military monopoly and to respect local businesspeople 
in order to secure enough food for a population of close to a million, including 
numerous prisoners of war and captured foreign civilians on Singapore Island. 
The prisoners of war were then given 460g rice rations for heavy-duty work 
until 9 March 1945.62 This was just a little more than the recommended level of 
420g rations for the locals on heavy duty.63
Autumn 1944: the Chōsabu’s Policy Implementation
Asking overseas Chinese businesses for help
After the transfer of the northern rice-producing region of Kedah to 
Thailand, restrictions on retail rice prices were lifted, and the market price 
of rice rose in October 1943. This situation became of major concern to the 
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Military Administration when severe flooding in Kedah in November, and 
conversion of rice paddies into experimental fi elds for agro-industry (for fi bre 
and munitions), followed by less than usual rainfall in spring 1944, added to the 
existing scarcity of rice, putting further upward pressure on prices.64 There was 
a sharp increase in the Japanese Government dollars sent to Alor Setar, Kedah, 
which led to the sudden announcement of the prohibition of unregulated rice 
imports on 20 March 1944. Mitsubishi and other Japanese trading companies 
were sent in to monopolize the collection of rice, but as their purchasing price 
was too low, they could not prevent the Alor Setar black market price from 
shooting up even further. 
Scarcity of Kedah rice and a reduction in general rations from February 
1944 onwards led to public discontent, which the Director of General Affairs, 
Hamada, took seriously and allowed the Chōsabu and Syonan Municipality 
to improvise a policy to allow direct import of rice from Bangkok by the 
overseas Chinese businesses in Singapore. A preparatory committee for 
Syonan Rice Import Association was inaugurated on 13 April, and the Padi 
Dealings Enactment, published on 3 May 1944, allowed Chinese businesses 
to deal directly with the rice mills.65 In Singapore, the Syonan Rice Import 
Association was established on 16 May by Tan Ken Koh of Tan Guan Lee Co. 
and other prominent Chinese leaders. In Penang, the young Chinese leaders 
of the Eppōsho (reading room),66 having opened by the Chōsabu on 4 June, 
created the Penang Rice Import Public Bureau on 20 June 1944. The problem 
was that Nami Kikan, the army’s secret intelligence agency also declared on 
16 May their involvement in rice imports via the east coast Singgora route.67 
Nami Kikan entered the Padi dealings in order to give work to the junk boat 
owners in return for their loyalty to the secret agency. The junk boats had been 




20 March, and were susceptible to being used by the Allied commandos. The 
Chōsabu report Rice Imports in Malaya, especially in Syonan Municipality68 
elaborates on how Nami Kikan’s activities impeded the initiative of the 
Chinese businesses leaders of Syonan Rice Import Association, and on how 
they managed to persuade the Nami Kikan to suspend selling rice in the city on 
August 6. From 17 August, rice imported by private traders appointed by the 
Syonan Rice Import Association and the Penang Rice Import Public Offi ce also 
supplied other states.
Importing rice through Alor Setar between the end of June and the end of 
August 1944, Penang Rice Import Bureau imported more than 60,000 picul 
(3,600 tons) of uncontrolled rice. While much of the imported rice at that time 
also came via Sumatra and Saigon by Mitsubishi-run cargo ships, in about four 
months by the mid-October 1944, Syonan Rice Import Association managed 
to import 123,461 picul (7,470 tons) which together with the seized cargoes 
from Nami Kikan amounted to 221,672 picul (13,411 tons).69 It is hard to 
judge how effective these rice import operations were, but one ex-Chōsabu 
member stated that it required constant hard work for him and his team to gain 
economic cooperation from the overseas Chinese on a level which, in the end, 
was capable of mobilizing large quantities of food, labour and even suffi cient 
money to build an airport.70 Having generated a fl urry of activity, the Military 
Administration gave a formal approval of ‘controlled’ private import in October 
1944, just when the Chōsabu report on rice imports was published, reporting 
on all this activity.71 At the end of the war, as of 31 August 1945, the Syonan 
Municipality stock of rice was a little more than the one-month reserve at 5,641 
tons, more than a third of which comprised private importers’ rice.72
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Infl ation as a refl ection of material shortage
From May to August 1944 Singapore’s food price index more or less 
stabilized, possibly due to the increased supply of rice brought in by the Syonan 
Import Association and others. Among the Chōsabu researchers, it was Higuchi 
who worked on the problem of high prices.73 He was sent to set up the Monetary 
Forum in Kuala Kangsar and Kuala Lumpur from 30 May.74 As described in the 
report Conditions of Economic Security prepared by the Police Administration 
Department, inconsistent rules to control prices and a lack of cooperation 
among the departments of the Municipality and Military Administration were 
creating an economic hazard that required a comprehensive and cooperative 
solution. Higuchi already felt helpless in face of the pressure of high prices, 
despite his tougher line of argument in his earlier report on Withdrawal of 
Local Currency. He concluded in a short article in the Chōsabu News that ‘all 
countries at war are facing the same problem’ and that they could do no more 
apart from following the standard measures of tightening rationing and price 
controls and absorbing any excess currency in circulation.75
The extent to which tight rationing, combined with the effort to increase 
food supplies, was effective in stabilizing price increases can be checked by 
the data on Syonan retail prices collected by the Chōsabu from April 1943 to 
January 1945 or later.76 Here it should be noted that the three components of 
the food price index – the ration prices, controlled prices and black market 
prices – were simply averaged and not properly weighted.77 The concept of a 
‘shopping basket’ was not yet employed. Soaring black market prices affected 
the daily lives of the Singaporeans, who required more food than was allowed 
in rations, but they may have affected the expensive Japanese restaurants as 
much as the locals. In March 1944, new offi cial prices for fresh fi sh and salted 




prices tend to rise fast because the Japanese restaurants were willing to pay 
so much for high-quality fi sh. The same was true of meat. In response to this 
situation, the Military Administration introduced the experiment of abolishing 
official prices in May 1944 in order to lower the market price of fish, meat 
and vegetables, in response to the request by the leaders of overseas Chinese 
businesses who strongly opposed against the ‘Associationism’ introduced by 
the Japanese Administration.78 ‘As soon as an Association (Kumiai) for any 
particular commodity was founded, the commodity soon disappeared from the 
market’.79 The fl attening of the price index from April to July 1944 may partly 
have resulted from this reversal measure.
Higuchi anticipated, however, that the abolition of offi cial prices would ‘only 
have a temporary effect’. As he pointed out in his report, it was not only the 
scarcity of food and raw materials that was driving up prices but also military 
defeats, which lowered the credibility of Japanese military scrip.80 The prices 
of perishable foods in the peninsula were also rising fast as the purchasing 
power of Singapore affected the producing areas. Higuchi seems to have been 
in two minds about the situation in Malacca and Kuala Lumpur. On one hand, 
he thought that removing all the restrictions on vegetables, fi sh and meat was 
inevitable, but on the other he was worried that ‘star-marked automobiles of the 
military units and their appointed agents come from the south to smuggle pork 
and vegetables out of the state without permission from the state council’.81 
The state council in Malacca abolished offi cial prices, following Singapore, but 
Selangor State introduced two levels of prices for perishables to prevent them 
from disappearing from the state’s official channels. Higuchi endorsed this 
halfway solution, which, in response to the needs of the Japanese (and the locals 
employed by the state) whose wages were pegged to the value of military scrip, 
secured meat, fi sh and vegetables at offi cial prices (implying a combination of 
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contract delivery and licensing). This, he believed, also provided incentives 
to producers and eased the inflow of perishable foods into the city, in order 
to allow ordinary citizens ‘whose incomes were not fi xed’ to get access to the 
available food at unrestricted prices.82
Managing the population in commerce and industry
Apart from his work on money, Higuchi authored a report entitled 
Reorganizing Commercial Businesses in Syonan Municipality.83 This report led 
on from Syonan Municipality Population by Occupation, which counted the 
number of people working in commercial businesses, although the Chōsabu 
authors were careful not to exaggerate the share of commercial population in 
the total population. Higuchi and his colleague were now given the task of 
choosing which businesses to close down, and by doing so they stepped in 
to prevent the Military Administration from choosing these at random. Many 
pages and tables in this report are allocated to the ‘resilience test’ of commercial 
businesses, based on the number of years in business and the amount of capital. 
The report avoids giving one single recommendation but leaves multiple 
simulations as the result of the resilience test, so that the final decision was 
not made by the authors themselves. Families in commercial businesses were 
expected to migrate outside Singapore to the new settlement in Endau, Johor, 
which was self-governed by the Overseas Chinese Association.84 Employees 
of commercial businesses were expected to become wage-earning industrial 
workers, for many factories run by Japanese companies suffered from a lack of 
workers and a high labour turnover rate. Three months later the ‘Restriction of 
Male Employment Ordinance’ was passed in order to bolster recruitment into 
the farming settlements and factories.85




factories was concerned with the working conditions in the factories. The 
author of the report observed that workers at factories run by local business 
people were much happier and did not tend to quit their jobs so readily. A Study 
of the Labour Situation in Syonan Municipality recommends that Japanese 
factories focus on retaining the existing workforce by giving them better 
pay in kind – particularly rice and tobacco – more holidays, better transport 
to work and better welfare facilities such as in-house clinics. The style of 
writing is remarkably different from Important Industrial Factories in Syonan 
Municipality, written by the Department of General Affairs over a year earlier, 
in which optimistic calculations for increasing output in the future had been 
made. The Chōsabu’s take on factories was far more cautious and expressed 
reservations about the suggestion of recruiting young female workers, which 
the Military Administration was pressing for. The author stressed that ‘in 
view of the intellectual level, physical strength, ethnic divisions and religious 
barriers of local women, in addition to the population composition of Syonan 
Municipality (the female population is 70% that of the male), female labour 
force ratios are to some extent as high as they can be’.86 Although the civilian-
run Japanese factories were reservedly recommended to change their traditional 
ways and start taking in more women, they were also urged to improve working 
conditions to prevent their workers from moving to the military sector, which 
paid much higher wages. They recommended that a centralized department for 
labour management for both civilian and military sectors should be created in 
order to stop competition for new recruits. They also urged the setting up of an 
institution to give educational guidance, training and labour exchange services 
for the local people.
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Demand and supply of food
The struggle against the economic monopoly of the military sector was 
the most pressing concern for Yamada, who was preoccupied by the issue of 
food allocation in Singapore. The Syonan Municipality staff did everything in 
their power to keep food supplies for local Singaporeans at least at subsistence 
level. In the diffi cult situation towards the end of the war, the Japanese staff of 
Singapore even went about purchasing meat and vegetables directly from the 
producers in other states so as not to be outdone by the military units.87 Much 
of their effort, however, went into cultivating and processing tapioca, which, 
with a shorter growing period, could provide a more immediate bulk solution 
for food shortages than rice. Sweet potatoes and tapioca were rationed in the 
raw, or as processed food, cooked, dried and pounded into powder because of 
their tendency to rot in the heat. There were 18 tapioca bread factories; bread 
was rationed through 1007 ration stations at one loaf per day for a household 
of three people and two loaves or more for larger families. The bread tasted 
just ‘like rubber’ or ‘like our eraser’, according to a Singapore resident.88 
There were also 29 tapioca noodle factories, whose products were rationed 
by Auxiliary Police Assistants and their sub-organizations, at 600g per family 
every three days.89
Foreseeing the possibility of total cessation of food imports in the event of 
the Allied landing, it became apparent that the level of local food production 
required was much higher and the acreage of land required for cultivation thus 
much larger.90 Yamada was set the task of calculating how much. The most 
signifi cant aspect of his writing in Methods of Increasing Food Production on 
Syonan Island was his strong recommendation that farmland under military 
management should be transferred to Syonan Municipality for civilian 




unproductive owing to a lack of fertilizers and bad subcontracting agents, who 
treated the locals in such a way that they were left with no incentive or strength 
to work. He recommended that of the existing 7,000 acres of military farmland, 
3,000 should be transferred to civilian use and a further 7,740 acres should be 
newly cultivated. To cultivate all this additional land, 6,130 farming families, 
comprising at least 18,390 able workers, were required. It was estimated that 
this land could produce tapioca at the rate of 2.5 tons and vegetables at the rate 
of 6 tons per acre per year, yielding 90g of tapioca and 96g of vegetables per 
person per day for 850,000 people in Singapore. Yamada concluded that this 
would allow 66.7% more carbohydrates and 45.5% more protein than the level 
achieved in autumn 1944 when the report was written.
It is difficult to know whether Yamada’s assumptions about potential 
production levels were realistic or whether he was making an over-optimistic 
estimate. He used the average productivity levels of the selected military 
farms as the basis for his calculation of civilian tapioca production. These 
were comparable to the reliable productivity level fi gures for Syonan farmers 
surveyed by his younger colleagues. These two colleagues stated that for 
professional farmers, average annual productivity levels for tapioca and 
vegetables were 5 and 12 tons per acre – that is, double the premise of the 
calculation behind Yamada’s recommendation.92 A different report written by 
a research officer in Medan, Sumatra, uses an average annual productivity 
level of tapioca as high as 16.2 tons per acre, to make a grand estimate that 
a community of 5 million residents could be fed by 20,000 professional 
farmers.93 Yamada carefully used much lower estimates, taking into account 
the poor soil condition of the newly cultivated land and the low skill levels 
of newly recruited farmers. His calculations indicated that, realistically, if the 
military did not hand over half of their good farmland, which was then poorly 
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managed, significant difficulty would be caused to the local population and 
Japanese Municipality staff alike. This was a stark criticism of the ineffi ciency 
in management and wasted acreage of land under military control.
Around the same time that Yamada was frantically calculating the size of 
the necessary farmland, he also had his co-author write up the results of the 
household expenditure survey of Malaya. The results of the cost of living survey 
were expected to reveal how the living standards of the locals had declined 
since the pilot survey in 1943, and whether the actions taken by the Chōsabu 
to crack down on harmful practices of military monopoly and to respect local 
businesspeople had really had any effect. Yamada and his co-author could thus 
provide their own verdict on the two years of Chōsabu work. Based on a mixed 
sample of what seemed to be average-level ordinary households – teachers and 
offi cers as well as coolies and street hawkers – the household spending records, 
which cover half a year from November 1943 to April 1944, reveal the effect of 
reduced rations in February 1944 as well as the effect of ongoing high infl ation. 
Expenditure survey results in monetary terms show that many of the items 
bought by ordinary families were either price controlled or rationed, so their 
expenditure did not rise as fast as the market price.
The survey results of quantities consumed show that the slower rise of 
household spending was also a manifestation of reduced rations. The combined 
amounts of daily carbohydrates – including rice, sweet potatoes and tapioca – 
were: Malays 282g, Indians 386g and Chinese 375g in February – April 1944, 
when ration reductions hit households hardest. The combined amounts of 
protein (mostly fi sh) were: Malays 70g, Indians 55g and Chinese 75g, which 
saw 10-20 percent reductions compared to November 1943 - January 1944.94 
Many households received special rations of tapioca bread, sugar and coconut 




a substantial amount of vegetables, beans and coconuts from the unregulated 
market. The levels of their calorifi c intake were on or above the bare subsistence 
level that the Chōsabu recommended in March 1944 at: Malays 1470 kcal, 
Indians 1956 kcal and Chinese 1826 kcal daily.
Yamada and his co-author seem to have conducted the second round of the 
household expenditure survey from May 1944, and intended to write it up too, 
but only the fi rst round of the survey was published belatedly in October 1944. 
Had the second survey results been published, they might have provided a real 
verdict on their efforts to increase food supply over half a year in Singapore. 
The statement of actual monthly supplies to Syonan Municipality, which was 
seized by the British Military Administration, tells us that on average 4,572 
tons of rice (5.4 kg per person for the population of 850,000) were received and 
distributed as rations between May and December 1944. The situation worsened 
in February and March 1945 with severe Allied bombing, but recovered 
towards the end of the war.95
In the fi nal months of occupation in 1945, Yamada – while also attending 
compulsory drills to blow up tanks with suicide bombs wrapped in blankets 
– was working frantically to push through an evacuation project in the 
Municipality. The project, which started with the Endau Settlement, had been 
expanded to other locations and had now been swamped with applicants. The 
Japanese thought that the British would occupy Pulau Ubin by July and start 
bombing Singapore. Evacuees were given rice, salt, sugar and military scrip 
and sent to the peninsula by train, or to Java or Sumatra by boat. All the survey 
research assistants of the various ethnic groups helped Yamada to send people 
out. On 13 August, as the fi nal boatload of 300 people left Keppel Harbour, he 
wished it a safe arrival in Jakarta. Had it not arrived safely, he could have been 
accused of war crimes for unnecessarily risking the lives of Singaporeans. 
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After the Unconditional Surrender
The announcement of surrender on 15 August 1945 was calmly accepted by 
the Chōsabu members and Japanese civilian administrators, who were prepared 
to die with the locals. The town was kept under control until the British arrived 
on 6 September. None of Yamada’s multi-racial team of survey assistants at 
Syonan Municipality was accused of helping the Japanese occupation.96 After 
the arrival of the British, the Japanese in Singapore voluntarily constructed a 
concentration camp in Jurong from scratch. Yamada lived there for half a year, 
in company with other Japanese civilians, growing vegetables and farming fi sh 
in the pond. A one-year supply of rice, miso and soy sauce was brought in from 
the Syonan Municipality storage, and eventually the British started to provide 
rations, including chocolate.97 Until he was allowed to board ship for Japan on 
13 April 1946, Yamada translated documents for the British.
In March 1946, back in Japan, the Institute of East Asian Economies was 
renamed the Institute of Economic Research. The membership list of the new 
Institute tells us that although its name was changed, its members and the structure 
remained the same: the University president Takase was the director of the Institute; 
Akamatsu, Itagaki and a few others were described as ‘on a research expedition 
in the south’. In August 1946, a new university president was elected and a ‘Purge 
Qualifi cation Committee’ was set up at Tokyo University of Commerce, following 
a decree from General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers.98 Sugimoto, who went to the south with Akamatsu, although only for six 
months, was selected as a member of the Committee. As in many organizations 
in Japan, those who were seen to have fascist ideas were purged and those who 




offi ces. Three people were purged from Tokyo University of Commerce. One of 
them had written an essay called ‘The historical inevitability of the Great East Asia 
Co-prosperity Sphere’ in the Annual Report on East Asian Economy. 
In the same volume, Akamatsu contributed a paper entitled ‘Historical 
patterns of East Asian trade’, which comprised tables on Japanese and Chinese 
world trade statistics from the late 19th century to the early 20th century.99 
Akamatsu’s catching-up theory was a story of export-oriented industrialization, as 
seen in the growth of textile industry in Japan, and could only function in a world 
of free trade and regional specialization. Akamatsu’s vision was not central to the 
Chōsabu’s work in Singapore and Malaya because it was not workable in the Co-
prosperity Sphere or the local self-sufficient economy created by the Japanese 
military. Having a pro-free trade emphasis in their research, Akamatsu and all the 
other researchers who were sent to the south survived the purge.100 Yamaguchi, 
who had been sent to Shanghai, was said to have shed tears when seeing one of 
the purged professors leaving the University.101
Ōtsuka, who was not employed by the University during the war, was 
allowed to come back to the University and was asked to become the new 
director of the Institute by its younger members in September 1946. A 
Reconstruction Committee for the Institute was set up in November 1946 with 
Ōtsuka, Akamatsu, Nakayama and Sugimoto as elected tenured professors, and 
eight elected younger members, including Yamada and Higuchi. At the end of 
1947, all the members submitted their resignations, and in January1948, Ōtsuka 
chose who were to remain at the Institute, and himself prepared to resign. Only 
Yamada and Tsuru Shigeto (1912-2006) were asked to remain, and the latter 
was nominated as the new director.102 Tsuru had come back from the US, where 
he had studied in the company of Paul Samuelson and Kenneth Galbraith and 
had been awarded a Ph. D. in Economics from Harvard University in 1940. 
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He had started teaching, immediately before the outbreak of the war, when he 
returned to Japan and joined the Institute of East Asian Economies. Nakayama 
became president of the now renamed Hitotsubashi University in October 1948.
Higuchi published Analysis of Infl ation in Japan with Yamaguchi in 1948.103 
They criticized the payment of a large sum of money (1,000 yen per person) to 
the few million civilian returnees from Korea, Taiwan, China and other occupied 
areas as the cause of high infl ation and the divergence between ‘effective demand’ 
and industrial production in the course of reconstruction in Japan. In the world 
of free speech after the war, they vocally argued that printing a large quantity of 
paper money could not stimulate production in post-war Japan. Higuchi published 
it as a researcher at Tokyo University of Commerce’s Institute of Economic 
Research, but later found a tenured post in Yokohama City University.104 He took 
early retirement from the University in 1970 aged 64 before he died of illness the 
following year. He never wrote or spoke publicly about his wartime experience.
Yamada translated into English his Malayan household expenditure surveys 
when he was a visiting scholar at the University of Malaya in the early 1960s, 
and left a copy there. He also wrote articles entitled ‘Measuring Changes in 
Economic Structure with Special Reference to the Industrial Population in 
Malaya’ and ‘Input-output Model of a Dual Economy’ for the newly established 
Malaysian Economic Journal on its first issue. He also wrote, in English, 
Theory and Application of Interindustry Analysis (1961), refl ecting his wartime 
interest in Wassily Leontief’s concept of input-output tables.105 He taught at 
Hitotsubashi University until his retirement and also served as the President 
of the Japanese Statistical Society between 1976 and 1978. He had an edited 
book in English dedicated to him on his retirement: Technology, Organization 
and Economic Structure: Essays in Honour of Prof. Isamu Yamada.106 While 




wartime experience in Malaya, and became instrumental in establishing the 
Institute of Developing Economies, gaining credits as a pillar of Asian research 
in Japan, Yamada never talked about his wartime existence even to his family 
until his death in 1986. He left a bundle of handwritten memoirs on his desk to 
be found by his family after his death.107
Concluding Remarks
This article shows how the Chōsabu men from the Institute of East Asian 
Economies of the Tokyo University of Commerce became involved in running the 
economy of Singapore during the course of war. They were ordinary academics, 
well-established in their professions, who viewed the opportunity of going to the 
south as a chance to continue research projects of their own preferences without 
being conscripted into the war effort. Before and during the war, methods of data 
collection and data analysis were being modernized and standardized within the 
government and academic institutes. The Japanese Military Administration in 
Singapore recognized the importance of accurate measurement of the economy, 
and thought the Chōsabu men could be used to stabilize the economy. Within a 
limited time and in adverse circumstances, the Chōsabu managed to produce a 
large number of original reports, providing a truthful picture of wartime economy 
as seen through their own eyes. If they had had more time and manpower, a 
more comprehensive research programme such as comparative surveys across 
different occupied areas within the Southern Regions might have been possible. 
Nevertheless, in terms of the economy of Singapore alone, the reports written 
during the occupation provide a useful guide, while also accounting for the 
dilemma that the members had to cope with, torn between their sympathy towards 
the local populace and the demands of the military.
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The Chōsabu members had to hide their regrets in having tried to help the 
local population, and in initiating modern economic research in Singapore 
and Malaya. After the war, they could not but feel quietly ashamed of their 
association with the army during the Japanese occupation. In post-war Japanese 
society, many of them – apart from Itagaki and Akamatsu – felt it diffi cult to 
give an adequate explanation of their struggle during the war.
The reason neither Akamatsu’s development theory nor Itagaki’s colonialism 
became central to or even noticeable in the Chōsabu’s research reports may be 
partly due their extreme care not to leave written documents with their names 
on. Other reasons may be, as noted already, their visions of development and 
imperialism being more closely linked to the world of free trade than the controlled 
economy. They realized on their arrival in Singapore that any form of ‘building 
Asia’ had already become unrealistic. The war economy was led by the optimistic 
research and planning activities of other departments and by private companies that 
had taken over mining and manufacturing activities all over the Southern Regions 
before the Chōsabu’s arrival. Thus, Akamatsu, Itagaki and a few others may have 
decided rather than restricting themselves to academic research to become active 
behind the scenes of the Military Administration. Further research is, however, 
necessary before forming any conclusions about their actual wartime involvement.
The Chōsabu reports and other related documents were left untouched in 
the library of the Institute of Economic Research at Hitotsubashi University 
for many decades.108 Despite their devoted efforts during the occupation years, 
the contributors and named authors of the Chōsabu reports – namely the junior 
scholars – tended to stay silent throughout their lives. Yamada’s memoir was 
only found posthumously, and was privately printed by his colleague and 
friend Itagaki in the 1980s. A careful reading of the Chōsabu reports reveals 




Malayan independence, the experience of each Chōsabu member was far more 
complicated and full of dilemmas.
The individual Chōsabu members’ experiences and how they reacted 
during their assignment in Singapore and Malaya differed widely. As the 
surviving reports reveal, Akamatsu and Itagaki’s pre-war agendas were not 
pronounced, while Higuchi and Yamada appeared to possess different ideas to 
one another and different attitudes towards the Military Administration. Many 
of their activities were governed by fear. Despite their inability to prevent 
socio-economic turmoil and mass malnutrition, however, the Chōsabu men 
openly disputed the military factions using their right to make judgments 
on the policies of the Military Administration. This may have contributed to 
keeping the population of Singapore from the mass starvation that affected all 
other parts of Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia, including many of the rice-
producing areas that were forced to deliver their crops.109 
* This article was written as one of the introductory notes on the forthcoming 
monograph: Gregg Huff and Shinobu Majima, eds., World War II Singapore: 
the Chōsabu Reports on Syonan (National University of Singapore Press), 
which includes an English translation of a selection of reports written by the 
Department of Research team. For further details and discussions, please refer 
to the forthcoming book.
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